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BOOK REVIEWS
The Contempt Power. By Ronald L. Goldfarb. New York: Columbia University Press, 1963. Pp. 366. $7.50.
In five chapters, requiring just over 300 pages, the author examines the many facets of a major feature of our legal system.
This feature is Government's power to coerce the cooperation of
the Individual and to punish his recalcitrance in matters of State.
Supporting scholarship-in the form of footnotes, tables of statutes,
cases, treatises, and an index-brings the volume to 366 pages.
Written for lawyer and layman alike, in a "style between specialty and catholicity," the book should prove quite useful as a reference work. For the practitioner it offers within reasonable compass
an initial insight into the vagaries of the contempt power which
can then, if necessary, be pursued with greater specificity in the
more technical legal literature. For judge and legislator seeking
light on the growing reach of the power, the volume provides a
helpful overview from twin vantage points of historical usage and
current practice. For those of a reform bent with respect to the
contempt power, the book is especially helpful for both its judicious
attitude toward, and its suggestions for, procedural and substantive
change.
At the editing level one notes a few blemishes which, although
minor, are perhaps surprising in a book published by a major University Press. The absence of blue-pencil treatment of the split
infinitive is doubtless intentional; better form has had to yield the
field to well-nigh universal practice. But "inferrible"' should have
caught a keen editorial eye, as should "the principle reason" ;2 the
same is true of the incorrect use of "effect" 3 and "devise,"' and of
the "witnesses duty to testify."5 More serious-and more debatable
-are a start-stop-start-again procedure in the development of certain ideas, which gives a jerkiness to the "flow" of the book, and
the inclusion of some recommendations in the analytical chapters
while others appear in the concluding chapter. Whether these fea1
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tures should have been "edited out" is difficult to say in the absence
of attempted rewrite; as they stand, they produce at once some
redundancy and the necessity for considerable cross-referencing.
Fly-specking apart, the volume under review is both readable
and worth reading. Appropriately enough, the first chapter sketches
the history of the contempt power. The heritage is fully acceptable,
for the "powers of contempt which are now exercised in the United
States originally were adopted from English common law."' Yet
withal there is the paradox that a concept which finds its rise in
the divine right of Kings has such a hold "in a government which
was conceived to establish the sovereignty of men."" This paradox
is similar to that anachronism of governmental immunity from
suit, which survives because in a far different political climate it
was reasonable to posit that the King could do no wrong. Nor, as
the author stresses, is it easy to reconcile some aspects of the contempt power with "American notions about the separation of governmental powers . . . ."' Yet a Nation which has so successfully
explained away the anomaly of judicial lawmaking while holding
to Montesquieu's principles should not have great difficulty with
this inconsistency.
Despite the many varieties of the contempt power which have
evolved, largely around contempt of court, "only two dichotomies
have been uniformly accepted and are still applied today. They are
the civil-criminal division, and the direct-indirect distinction.", In
consequence, the author devotes Chapter II to an analysis of these
two major classifications. Actually, however, the analytical division
is a three-fold one, for as the author observes, "indirect contempt
cases arising out of press publications have a history and significance
which warrant singular mention." 1 Indeed, it is with respect to
constructive contempt that courts of this country receive their best
rating at the hands of analyst Goldfarb. Here, "as contrasted with
all other contempt cases, American courts seem to be less impressed
or guided by historical precedent and practices than with deciding
some realistic rule by which vital, competing interests can best be
harnessed."'
OId. at 45.
7Ibid.

8
Id. at 36.
* Id. at 47.
10
.1d. at 77.
21 Id. at 99-100.
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Contrasting the English and American rules on press control by
the courts, the author comes to the following well-articulated conclusion:
I suggest that there is sound reason for discouraging, by use
of the contempt power, the dissemination by mass media of information which might later be used as evidence at trial. This
would be a rationally connected means to a legitimate end-protecting the evidentiary rules of judicial proceedings. There is
serious question, on the other hand, about the value of carrying
this rule any farther. Editorial opinion-venturing, criticism, description, these aspects of the journalism of law are invaluable
and certainly outweigh any claims for abstract judicial purity
of the broad application of the
which may be offered in defense
12
constructive contempt rule.
Patently enough, the American rule is the product largely of
active intervention on the part of the Supreme Court of the United
States, first in interpretation of the federal statute controlling federal-court contempt power and secondly in interpretation of the free
press guaranty beginning with Bridges v. California.'3 General
judicial effort with the direct-indirect and civil-criminal classifications scarcely merits a passing mark, in the opinion of the author.
Discussion of the varieties of the contempt power is followed by
a chapter on the extension of the power to governmental bodies
other than legislatures and courts. Briefly considered are executive
officers, grand juries, referees, and notaries public; the great portion
of the chapter is devoted to administrative agencies. Despite the
fact that, historically, contempt was actually neither judicial nor
legislative, but executive in origin, direct contempt power is not an
inherent feature of these governmental bodies. Although the problems encountered by them, and for which they might employ this
power, are similar to those experienced by legislative assemblies
and judicial tribunals, they must depend for the power upon statutory grant. While such authority has gone unchallenged in the case
of some of these bodies, notably the notary public, both due-process
and separation-of-powers doctrines have created problems for
others, specifically the administrative agency.
One possible solution developed by the author employs analogical reasoning to conclude that, for example, the grand jury is but
an arm of the court and that, as a further instance, the administraI1d. at 89.
314 U.S. 252 (1941).
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tive tribunal is engaging in a quasi-judicial capacity. A bolder approach would be the position "that the power is neither judicial nor
legislative but truly administrative,"' 4 a power essential to any governmental body charged with responsibility for the formulation or
enforcement of law.
Despite these possible avenues for overcoming constitutional objections, the author favors restriction of the direct contempt power
to those agencies of government now possessed of it. On the other
hand, cognizant of the broader need for some method of compulsion,
he outlines with particularity how he would strengthen the hand
of both grand jury and administrative agency by streamlining the
mechanisms for court enforcement of their contempt citations. This
is one instance of the author's anticipation of his concluding chapter, wherein he formulates his recommendations for modification
of present contempt practices with respect to all forms of governmental action.
Accounting for a full one-third of the book is the chapter on
"Limitations on the Contempt Power." These are primarily various
constitutional limitations, found largely in the first, fourth, fifth,
sixth, seventh, eighth, and tenth amendments to the Constitution
of the United States. The author's coverage at this point must
perforce be substantial; "Few legal devices find conflict within the
pages of our constitution with the ubiquity of the contempt
power."' 5 Only with respect to the conflict between federal and
state powers does the contempt power enter but indirectly and infrequently.
The many procedural guaranties vouchsafed by the fifth, sixth,
seventh, and eighth amendments receive careful attention as regards
their bearing upon contemporary use of the contempt power. "The
most glaring and disputed denial of civil liberties which is featured
under current contempt procedures is the denial of the right of an
accused to have a trial by jury."' 6 Even Mr. Justice Black "has
found no fault with summary procedures for civil contempts, though
7
he has suggested that all criminal contempts be tried by a jury.'
What alleviation there has been has come by way of congressional
legislation. The author is equally dissatisfied with the failure of
GOLDFARB, op. cit. supra note 1, at 138.
Id. at 162.
17 Id. at 168-69.
Id. at 175.
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judicial interpretation of the fifth and eighth amendments to rid
our law of the anomaly of a proceeding where one and the same
person acts as judge, prosecutor, jury and sentencer; of the predicament of the contemnor "who, not knowing which way to turn"1 8 in
the labyrinth of double jeopardy and self-incrimination, "elects to
stand still" ;1 and of contempt fines and sentences which in magnitude have all the earmarks of harshness when judged in context.
Sandwiched in between discussion of the contempt power and
the various procedural guaranties is that of the constitutional clash
between power and limitation under the first and fourth amendments (with bill of attainder tossed in for completeness). In the
reviewer's judgment this section" is perhaps the best in the volume
and well repays study for the inclusiveness of its coverage and the
incisiveness of its analysis.
The concluding chapter of the book under review, appropriately
enough, is devoted to the policy question of the proper place to be
accorded the contempt power in our legal system. Identifying four
choices, the author rejects the two extremes of full retention and
complete abolition of the power. In previous chapters he has found
it impossible to reconcile with accepted concepts of individual liberty
the full contempt power as it has developed in this country. On the
other hand, convinced that the major arms of government must be
able to force compliance with public processes, the author finds a
continuing role for such a power. But he would severely limit the
congressional contempt power (although saving Congress's investigating power); he would essentially eliminate the civil contempt
power; he would have done with the doctrine of contempt by publication; and he would subject the remaining criminal contempt
power to full procedural due process, including jury trial. "Contempt should be strictly construed to be what it has historically been
-a criminal wrong to government manifested through an act of
disrespect or disobedience."'"
In place of civil contempt the author would perfect such powers
of execution as garnishment, levy, and attachment as a preventive
against defeat of proper court orders. Physical disorders he would
handle through a summary power of physical control and expulsion;
,8 id. at 250.
10Ibid.
20 Id. at 185-230.
21 Id. at 292.
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such can be justifiably said to be "truly inherent in any legitimate
working government body.""2 Those contempts now classified as
criminal (and some aggravated contempts now called civil but bearing earmarks of the criminal), other than those concerned with
physical disorder, he would govern by a statute defining the offense
of "misdemeanor to government." The suggested statute is
sketched 3 without any attempt at technical draftsmanship. A short
discussion of the statute's applicability to contempts of Congress,
courts, and administrative bodies concludes this final chapter.
FRANK R. STRONG

DEAN, COLLEGE OF LAW

THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

The Morality of Law. By Lon L. Fuller. New Haven and London:
Yale University Press. 1964. Pp. 202. $5.00.
When the editor handed me this book and asked me to look
it over to see if it was worth reviewing, my answer was, "Anything by Lon Fuller is worth reviewing." Reading the book confirmed the opinion.
Jurisprudential books on law and morals usually examine the
relationship between law and moral principles which may exist apart
from the law. Professor Fuller, formerly of Duke Law School
and now at Harvard Law School, in this book expounds something quite different. He is concerned primarily with what he calls
"the internal morality of law," that is, with requirements which
the law itself must meet. Otherwise put, there are moral requirements binding on men which the law may further. These Fuller
calls the external morality of law. There are also moral requirements binding on the law itself if it is to be good law. These he
calls the internal morality of law. The latter are the principal subject of the book.
Professor Fuller first distinguishes moralities of duty and of
aspiration. The first consist of those moral principles so basic to
the existence of a society that they can be and are successfully made
into legal rules. Usually they are phrased as prohibitions: do not
kill, do not steal, do not assault another. Beyond these are morali22 Id. at 305.

-2 Id. at 302.
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ties of aspiration, which lead men toward the goal of the highest
good which can be achieved. These are not reducible to legal rules.
"There is no way by which the law can compel a man to live up
to the excellences of which he is capable." 1 The author asks us
to imagine a moral scale, beginning at the bottom with the most
obvious demands of social living and extending upward to humanity's highest aspirations. Somewhere along the scale is a dividing
line where duty ends and the challenge of excellence begins. Translated into terms of law making, there is a point where legal requirement can no longer successfully be made, since men cannot be
compelled to aspire. Just where the dividing line is to be drawn
is a subject of moral argument. If the line is drawn too high,
rigid obligation may stifle experiment and inspiration. If drawn
too low, necessary requirements may give way to individual moral
opinions.
The internal morality of the law, according to Professor Fuller, is largely morality of aspiration. In his second chapter he lays
down eight requirements of this internal morality. They are as
follows: (1) Generality. That is, there must be rules, rather than
separate treatment for each individual case. (2) Promulgation.
The law must be made known. (3) Prospective nature. Laws should
not be retroactive. (4) Clarity. Laws should be comprehensible
to those affected. (5) Uncontradictory nature. Laws should not
command and forbid the same thing. (6) Possibility. Laws should
not require the impossible. (7) Constancy through time. Laws
should not be changed too often. (8) Congruence between official
action and declared rule. Those who administer the law should
abide by it.
At first glance most of these principles look like nothing more
than familiar requirements of good legal craftsmanship. It is in
the discussion of each that Professor Fuller shows that he is dealing with matters going far beyond the obvious. For example, in
his discussion of the principle that law should not command the
impossible, he takes up laws imposing strict criminal liability in
such fields as economic regulation. Under these laws a person may
be convicted although he acted with an innocent intent. Fuller points
out that such laws serve the convenience of the prosecutor; all he
must prove is conduct which does not coincide with the legal re-

I FuLLER,
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quirement; he escapes the difficult job of proving intent or fault.
Injustice is supposed to be avoided by selective enforcement, which
means that the prosecutor will go after the real villains, not those
who innocently engage in conduct which does not square with the
law. This justification does not appeal to Professor Fuller. This
reviewer agrees with him, but finds it a little hard to see that strict
criminal liability is an illustration of law commanding the impossible, unless the author's idea is that there are so many economic
regulations that no one as a practical matter can know and obey
them all.
Professor Fuller's eight requirements do not, at first blush, seem
to be moral in nature, but appear to be requirements of excellence
rather than morality. Even bearing in mind that aspiration toward
excellence constitutes the upper level of Fuller's moral scale, is all
excellence, including technical excellence, to be equated with morality? However, further reflection indicates that the eight requirements do have a moral content, even when "moral" is regarded in
the usual sense as pertaining to right and wrong. For example, the
first requirement, that of generality, which calls for legal rules
rather than separate treatment of individual cases, prevents discrimination among individuals where their merits are the same, and
such discrimination is felt to be wrong morally. Indeed, the feeling
that such discrimination is wrong furnishes much of the moral urge
behind the movement against race discrimination. The fourth requirement, clarity, to the draftsman of a statute may be simply an
exaction of good craftsmanship, but the person subjected to the
statute readily senses that he has been wronged if he has been deliberately subjected to legal requirements so unclear that he cannot
tell what they are.
In his third chapter, Professor Fuller considers various views
of the nature of law in comparison with his own. He adds his
definition of law to the voluminous collection of definitions which
milleniums of juristic thought have produced. According to Fuller,
"law is the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules." 2 He treats law as an activity. This fits in with
his eight requirements for governing the activity.
In this chapter Professor Fuller makes a lengthy attack on the
views of H. L. A. Hart in his book, The Concept of Law, published
2Id. at 106.
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in 1961. A familiar device of legal scholars is to select some other
legal scholar and vigorously assault his position. People are interested in conflict, and dispute adds zest to exposition. Of course,
this device is not limited to legal scholars. We recall the story of
the two newspapers which engaged in a long and acrimonious controversy over something or other. It turned out that both newspapers were edited by the same man, who had written not only the
opposing views of each paper but also the vituperative attacks on
them by the other paper. It was a promotional device to sell both
papers. The reviewer is not suggesting that authors Fuller and Hart
are one and the same man, nor that Fuller's disagreement with Hart
is a sales device. Scholarly books on jurisprudence are not written
with sales in mind. Legal writers with an eye on the market are
more likely to turn out books like Anatomy of a Murder.' Nor is
Fuller's attack vituperative. The sedate quarreling of learned men
can be carried on with the highest respect for each other. Fuller
prefaces his disagreement with Hart by calling the latter's book "a
contribution to the literature of jurisprudence such as we have not
had in a long time."4 But he adds that he is in virtually complete
disagreement with the fundamental analysis of the concept of law
expressed in Hart's book. Fuller's main attack is on Hart's "rule
of recognition," which Fuller explains as a rule recognizing some
agency as having the final say as to what shall be considered law.
Fuller raises many objections. He argues that if the rule of recognition means that anything called law by the recognized lawgiver is
law, then the citizen may be worse off than a gunman's victim. "If
a gunman says, 'Your money or your life,' it is certainly expected
that if I give him my money, he will spare my life. If he accepts
my purse and then shoots me down, I should suppose his conduct
would not only be condemned by moralists, but also by right-thinking highwaymen." 5 Professor Fuller thinks there are tacit limitations on those who exercise power.
In his fourth chapter, on the substantive aims of law, Fuller
discusses the relation between the internal morality of law and the
external aims to be achieved by law. He makes the point that to
achieve the best of legal objectives requires internally good law.
As he frequently does, he uses here an analogy. "A conscientious
'VOELKER,

ANATOmY OF A MURDER

(1958).

op. cit. supra note 1, at 133.
Id.at 139.
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carpenter, who has learned his trade well and keeps his tools sharp,"'
can as well devote himself to building a hangout for thieves as to
building an orphans' asylum, but it still takes a good carpenter to
erect a good asylum.
In this chapter Fuller reasons that the internal morality of the
law requires a view as to the nature of man. To embark on the
enterprise of subjecting human conduct to rules implies commitment to the view that man is or can become a responsible agent.
Fuller vigorously refutes the modem notion, conceived as scientific
by some doctrinaire schools of social scientists, that man is not a
free and responsible agent making choices by an act of will, but
that what he does is determined by conditions. Fuller thinks that
this is partial truth pushed beyond its proper limits, and that it is
encouraging indifference to decay in the concept of responsibility.
The reviewer concurs. This deterministic view is not science but
an idea relished by some social scientists. Since it holds that responsibility is unscientific, the inevitable effect is to diminish or
destroy the feeling of responsibility on the part of the people to
the extent that it is accepted. Such social scientists might well reflect on their own responsibility for the consequences of their doctrine.
In an appendix, Professor Fuller uses a familiar pedagogical
device. Instead of telling he asks. He sets forth a hypothetical
country in which the Purple Shirts take over the government. Although the country and the regime are supposed to be imaginary,
they bear a remarkable resemblance to Germany under the Nazis.
The regime is overthrown. The problem is what action, if any,
should be taken against persons who paid off grudges by reporting
to the Purple Shirt regime forbidden activities of their neighbors.
Five recommendations are made, one by each of five deputies of
the Minister of Justice. The reader is asked which of the five
recommendations he would adopt if he were the Minister. Professor Fuller gives no hint of his answer. He puts his readers to work.
The above cannot qualify as an outline of Fuller's book. It is
rather a sketch of salient features. The book is based on lectures
given as part of a lecture series at Yale University in 1963. Professors of Jurisprudence accumulate many ideas and materials in

0Id. at 155-56.
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their notes. When they come to give lectures and write books these
ideas and materials are put in, even if they have to be squeezed in.
The result is that when a book is produced it is likely to be more
of a panorama of the author's thoughts than a closely knit presentation. Professor Fuller's book gave this reviewer such an impression. This is not intended as an adverse criticism; the idea is simply
to let the reader know what to expect. The great value of the book
is that it enables the reader to follow the keen mind of the author
as he reflects on many important matters jurisprudential. Hopefully, the reader will be stimulated to some thoughts of his own on
these matters. This kind of process can be illustrated from the last
three pages of Fuller's fourth chapter. Fuller found in H.L.A.
Hart's book, The Concept of Law, the view that "'the proper end
of human activity is survival.' ",7 This stimulated a reaction by
Fuller. In dissenting he pointed to the remark of Thomas Aquinas
that "if the highest aim of a captain were to preserve his ship, he
would keep it in port forever."' Fuller endeavors to do better than
Hart did in selecting a principle infusing all human aspiration. He
finds it "in the objective of maintaining communication with our
fellows."' This stimulated a reaction by the reviewer. Fuller did
better than Hart, but not well enough. In supporting his stand,
Fuller states that if in the future man survives his own powers of
self destruction, it will be because he can communicate and reach
understanding with his fellows. Quite true. But if he does destroy
himself that will be for the same reason. Individuals unable to
communicate with others never could have produced the hydrogen
bomb. Maintaining communication with our fellows is a means to
many ends, good and bad.
If neither Hart nor Fuller is right, then what is the object of
humanity's upward reach, or, in Fuller's language, of man's morality of aspiration? Religious juristic writers have said that humanity's goal is God."0 With such a goal humanity reaches toward
truth and goodness that are infinite, and therefore not fully attainable. But in reaching man grows in the nature of that which he
seeks. When he abandons this quest and substitutes some fully
7
Id. at 185.
'Ibid. The words quoted are Fuller's.
Ibid.
E.g., Miltner, Law and Morals, 10 NoTRE DAME LAW. 1, 10 (1934).
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understandable goal of his own devising, his objective becomes insufficient and attainment produces frustration.
FRANK HANFT
PROFESSOR OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT CHAPEL HILL

When the Cheering Stopped. By Gene Smith. New York: William
Morrow and Co., 1964. Pp. 307. $5.95
Mr. Smith presents in this volume a highly detailed account of
the last years of Woodrow Wilson. His description reads almost
like a novel, and the reader feels himself being cast along on the
crest of events that made the presidency of Wilson a period of controversy among students of political science and American history.
The major portion of the book deals with the period after Wilson's
second marriage. Smith gives the reader a feeling of participation
in America's involvement in World War I, Wilson's triumphant
trip to Europe following the war, and the many conferences that
led to the drafting of the Charter of the League of Nations.
We then follow the infighting as Wilson tried to convince the
Senate to ratify the treaty. We watch the tragedy of the President's
declining health as he traveled across the country attempting to sell
the League of Nations to the American people. Following the seizure that disabled him, we return with Wilson to Washington and
watch the valiant fight his wife waged to protect him from political
enemies and the outside world. Many may claim that the second
Mrs. Wilson served as President for the final fifteen months of
her husband's second term. But for all practical purposes, we would
have to conclude that the office was virtually vacant. Wilson was
unable to perform the myriad of duties that keep the President
working at an almost inhuman pace. Efforts were made to keep
the government operating, but only the most important of the major
issues were brought to Wilson's attention. He was shielded by his
wife from as much of the harsh reality of the Presidency as was
possible.
Unfortunately, the major impression left with the reader of this
book is that of a pathetic figure. Wilson is shown in a role similar
to that of a Shakespearean tragic hero. His cause appears to be
hopeless, and we are tempted to damn him as a fool because of the

1964]

BOOK REVIEWS

stubbornness he exhibits in refusing to compromise on the provisions of the treaty that would carry the United States into the
League of Nations if it could win the approval of the Senate. The
pathetic image depresses the reader even further as he watches the
President slowly dying in the midst of a self-delusion in which he
may have felt himself healthy enough to run for a third term.
But this is not an accurate picture of the Woodrow Wilson who
was first elected to our highest office in 1912. He was a vigorous
man. He was also one of the most idealistic of our Presidents. It
was not until our entry into the United Nations following World
War II that we even appeared to be taking the first steps toward
the world of peace that he envisioned. Perhaps he was too idealistic.
But in his lifetime, Wilson was the epitome of what many people
wish all political leaders were.
The most provocative message that emerges from Smith's description of Woodrow Wilson is one that the author may not have
consciously intended. At the time of Wilson's disability, virtually
everyone, including Vice-President Thomas R. Marshall, was kept
in the dark about the true nature of the President's illness. Smith
mentions that:
Marshall appeared terrified by the turn of events and was bitter
at the doctors who were keeping the situation a mystery from
him. He said that it would be at best a tragedy for him to assume
the duties of President and an equal tragedy for the American
people, that he knew many men who knew more about the affairs
of the government than he .... I
This clearly outlines the gaping void in our federal statutes concerning presidential succession and inability, a void that was discussed at the time of President Eisenhower's heart attack and that
has been mentioned more recently as a result of the assassination of
President Kennedy.
Marshall was a Vice-President in the old tradition, one who was
added to the ticket simply to balance it and to win needed electoral
support for the presidential candidate. But there was no guideline
to follow, even if Wilson's Cabinet had wanted to establish Marshall
in the Presidency. And, what is even more frightening, there is
still no formal policy to be followed in the event of presidential
disability.
' SMITH, WHEN THE CHEERING STOPPED 98 (1964).
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It is reassuring to know that President Eisenhower had worked
out an informal agreement with Richard Nixon, and that the late
President Kennedy had done the same with Lyndon Johnson. How
much more satisfying it would be if a formal policy were incorporated into our federal statutes so that the United States could
never again be subjected to the lack of direction that occurred during
the last fifteen months of Wilson's administration.
Last August, the Senate Judiciary Committee presented a report
concerning presidential succession and disability to the Senate. The
Committee stated in that report:
The final success of any constitutional arrangement to secure
continuity in cases of inability must depend upon public opinion
and their [the President and Vice-President's] possession of a
sense of "constitutional morality." Without such a feeling of
responsibility there can be no absolute guarantee against usurpation. No mechanical or procedural solution will provide a complete answer if one assumes hypothetical cases in which most of
the parties are rogues and in which no sense of constitutional propriety exists. It seems necessary that an attitude be adopted that
presumes that we shall always be dealing with "reasonable men"
at the highest governmental level. 2
This Senate Committee was called for the passage of legislation that would protect us from the void that occurred in the Wilson administration. It recognized that in a society existing within
the scope of our advanced arms technology, we would be flirting
with international disaster if such a void were allowed to exist, if
only for a short period of time. The report of the Committee members, as indicated above, called for the Senate, and their fellow
Americans, to set aside partisan political considerations in favor of
a view that sees our political leaders as Americans first and power
seekers second. It is reminiscent of the very optimistic, idealistic
view of rational man that was so strongly advocated by Woodrow
Wilson himself. The need is clear. Mr. Smith's book has helped
bring it into much sharper focus.
LEON S. COHEN
INSTRUCTOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT CHAPEL HILL
' SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, PresidentialInability and Vacancies
in the Office of the Vice-President, S. REP. No. 1382, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.

11 (1964).
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